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Introduction
There are many works about the history of Croatia in the period after 1945. 
Most of historians would agree with the statement that 1940’s are the most 
and best analysed period in the second half of the 20th century. The reason for 
that is mostly the time distance, which is most seriously considered by histo-
rians dealing with recent history. Time distance has a number of advantag-
es, such as the slight probability of living participents partakers influencing 
the researcher with their social power and partiality, but also the research-
er’s weaker emotional link to the events he participated in. These advantag-
es win over the disadvantages, such as fewer sources and the possibility of 
direct insight into events or social relations of the times just elapsed. Apart 
from that, one should not, of course, forget the political reasons, especially in 
the conditions of the one-party system until 1991, in which the government 
was always interested in subjecting to criticism the abandoned ruling models 
and systems of power, rather than to have an equal approach to its own role in 
the immediate past, which was seen as an opportunity to sing its own prais-
es. Despite the fact that the beginning of the rule of the Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia/Communist Party of Croatia (Komunistička partija Jugoslavije/
Komunistička partija Hrvatske - KPJ/KPH) has been researched extensively, 
and not only by historians, it seems that we are still far from the satisfactory 
level of research results pertaining to that period, as well as the reconstruction 
of the events and their interpretation. 
I shall give a short contribution to the understanding of the period, 
in which the KPJ, after the successful end of the liberation and civil war, 
assumed power with the intention to carry out its revolutionary reorganisa-
tion of the society in accordance with Marxist doctrines and by applying the 
USSR’s experience, from the point of view of the destiny of political parties, 
movements and churches on Croatian territory.
Ustashas and the Independent State of Croatia
The establishment of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna 
Država Hrvatske - NDH) was the result of the Ustasha movement’s activ-
* Zdenko Radelić, Ph. D., Croatian Institute of History, Zagreb, Republic of Croatia
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ities. The Ustashas were militant, conservative and traditional nationalists 
with an emphasised anti-communist tone, whose main purpose to estab-
lish a Croatian state was accomplished in the circumstances of the down-
fall of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which was destroyed and divided by the 
Tripartite Pact forces: the Third Reich, the Kingdom of Italy, Hungary and the 
Kingdom of Bulgaria.1 The Ustashas used the results of German and Italian 
imperialist plans, as well as the desire of a large part of the Croatian nation 
to have more autonomy, to proclaim the Croatian state upon the attack on 
Yugoslavia. Apart from the desire of the Croatian nation, and the activities 
of the Ustasha movement, led by Ante Pavelić, and  “divine providence”, the 
state was also created by the “will of our allies”, and that very fact, apart from 
the war circumstances, determined to a large extent its internal structure 
and international position.2 One of the logical consequences of the alliance 
with Italy was the loss of a large part of Croatian territory, which Rome used 
in an attempt to restore the former Roman Empire. Another consequence 
of the choice of such allies, who were working to destroy the foundations 
of the “Versailles Europe”, was a closer ideological tie to German National 
Socialism, which included racist persecutions of Romany and Jewish minor-
ities. In addition to that, there were regulations against the Serb minori-
ty, which was pursuing the restoration of Yugoslavia, and which was con-
sidered by the Ustashas to be the worst enemy of the Croatian state. One 
could say that the chauvinist discrimination or persecution of Serbs was the 
Ustasha movement’s original solution for the long-term stabilisation of the 
Croatian state. Quite contrary to such intentions, the Ustasha authorities’ 
retribution against a part of its population, as well as Croatia’s link with the 
“new order” forces in the war against the Western democracies and the com-
munist USSR, turned a large part of the population, even those who were 
not directly threatened, against the NDH. 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia
From the beginning of their activities, the Communists were relying on 
the USSR and waiting for favourable conditions to start their revolution. 
In accordance with the Marxist ideology of unavoidable class conflict, they 
wanted to introduce a dictatorship of the proletariat, or rather the dictator-
ship of the KPJ. They could not come to terms with the occupation, the par-
titioning of Yugoslavia, the loss of a large part of Croatia, and the repres-
sive policy of the Ustasha authorities. But, the immediate cause for the 
armed resistance was the attack of the Third Reich on the USSR, which was 
Germany’s ally since 1939.  
1 See in: Fikreta Jelić Butić, Ustaše i Nezavisna država Hrvatska 1941-1945.(Ustashas and 
the Independent State of Croatia 1991-1945), (Zagreb: Sveučilišna naklada Liber-Školska 
knjiga, 1978); Aleksa Đilas, Osporena zemlja. Jugoslavenstvo i revolucija (Contested Country. 
Yugoslavianism and Revolution) (Belgrade: Književne novine, 1990).
2 Petar Požar, ed., Ustaša. Dokumenti o ustaškom pokretu (Ustasha. Documents on the Ustasha 
Movement) (Zagreb: Zagrebačka stvarnost, 1995), p. 133.
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The Communists wanted to restore Yugoslavia, but this time as a federa-
tion of equal republics. They were dedicated to the National Front (Narodna 
fronta - NF) programme, which guaranteed a just solution of social and 
national issues, freedom and equality. In several public statements they 
claimed that they were not fighting for their dictatorship and radical chang-
es. They also claimed that they would guarantee political pluralism and private 
property, and that the movement’s main aims were people’s liberation and peo-
ple’s democracy. In that sense, they published The Declaration of the Supreme 
Command of the People’s Liberation Army (Narodnooslobodilačka vojska - NOV) 
and the Partisan Units of Yugoslavia (Partizanski odredi Jugoslavije - POJ) 
and Anti-fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (Antifašističko 
vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije - AVNOJ), on 8 February 1943, and 
The Declaration on the Aims and Principles of the People’s Liberation War of 
the Preparatory Committee of the Land Anti-fascist Council of the People’s 
Liberation of Croatia (Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja 
Hrvatske - ZAVNOH) and the General Command of the People’s Liberation 
Army and Partisan Units of Croatia (Glavni štab Narodnooslobodilačke 
vojske i partizanskih odreda Hrvatske - GŠ NOV and POH) on 26 May 1943.3 
But, behind the proclaimed programme, the KPJ was hiding its revolutionary 
content. Communists were revealing it only gradually. That became more 
open in 1945, and all of their intentions were uncovered in 1948, during the 
conflict with Stalin and the Cominform . 
Croatian Peasant Party
From the beginning of the war, the Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljačka 
stranka - HSS), as Croatia’s strongest political party, kept both the Ustashas 
and Communists at distance.4 Nevertheless, it should be underlined that both 
radical wings of Croatia’s politics, the Ustasha movement and the KPJ/KPH, 
were dedicated to some solutions, which were close to the ideas of many 
HSS followers. Many accepted the Ustashas’ dedication to the sovereignty of 
the Croatian nation in its ethnic and historical territory. With such a deci-
sion they actually renounced their leadership and the party. But, although 
only declaratively, they did not give up the ideology of the Radić brothers. 
Nevertheless, they melted into the Ustasha movement and shared its desti-
ny – military defeat and emigration. Many of those who stayed were social-
ly marginalized and persecuted, and many others were killed. Although the 
HSS leadership nurtured the idea of an independent Croatian state, it refused 
3 Hodimir Sirotković, ed., Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske, 
Zbornik dokumenata 1943. (Land Anti-fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Croatia, 1943) 
(Zagreb: Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta, 1964), p. 132. 
4 See in: Ljubo Boban, Kontroverze iz povijesti Jugoslavije (Controversies from the Yugoslav 
History), volumes. 1 and 2 (Zagreb: Stvarnost and Školska knjiga, 1989); Fikreta Jelić Butić, 
Hrvatska seljačka stranka (Croatian Peasant Party) (Zagreb: Globus, 1983); Zdenko Radelić, 
Hrvatska seljačka stranka 1941.-1950. (Croatian Peasant Party 1941-1950) (Zagreb: Croatian 
Institute of History, 1996).
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co-operation with the Ustasha authorities and their radical policy, as well as 
the alliance with the Axis states. The basis of Vladko Maček’s policy was to 
keep the HSS uncompromised, so that it could be re-activated in a favourable 
moment and continue its work aimed at strengthening, and possibly expand-
ing,  the Autonomous Banovina of Croatia conceived in 1939.
The HSS was distanced in a similar way from the illegal KPJ and the par-
tisan movement, in which the KPJ imposed its monopoly. The leadership 
knew that the KPJ would instrumentalise the liberation war in its strug-
gle for power, but many party members saw their joining with the parti-
san movement as the only remaining solution in their resistance against 
Ustasha policy and  foreign occupation. 
That very ability of the KPJ to present the HSS and the NF programmes 
as overlapping programmes influenced the decision of many HSS members 
to join the partisans. The KPJ policy towards the HSS may be reduced to 
three crucial points: 1) to draw as many HSS members as possible to the 
partisans, so that the People’s Liberation Movement (Narodnooslobodilački 
pokret - NOP) could have a larger number of Croats; 2) to discard Maček 
and the HSS leadership under the pretext of their treason; 3) to impose a 
The People’s Republic of Croatia in 1947. Contemporary map.
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new leadership on  the party, which would be used by the Communists in 
their struggle for power and serve to the proclaimed JNOF (Jedinstvena 
narodnooslobodilačka fronta) programme, in fact the disguised KPJ pro-
gramme. Everything depended on the need to have as many Croats as pos-
sible joining partisans in order to win the war and gain international recog-
nition of the new Yugoslavia under Communist rule. 
Of course, those HSS members who joined the partisans renounced 
the HSS leadership and Maček. But unlike the first group which joined 
the Ustashas, this group formed a new leadership, the so-called Executive 
Committee of the Croatian Peasant Party (Izvršni odbor Hrvatske seljačke 
stranke - IO HSS) – after June 1945 the Executive Committee of the Croatian 
Republican Peasant Party (Izvršni odbor Hrvatske republikanske seljačke 
stranke - IO HRSS) – and declared itself as the real representative of the 
HSS. They invoked the original party’s principles, which were, in their view, 
betrayed by Maček. 
Regarding the fact that many HSS followers joined either the Ustashas or 
the partisans, and that the West – the allied major powers in the war against 
the Third Reich and the Kingdom of Italy, and the rivals of the Communist 
USSR, representatives of the East – made its support conditional on an active 
fight against Germans, the Peasant Party tried to re-activate itself at the end 
of the war. The HSS leadership abandoned the wait-and-see policy in the 
attempt to eliminate the risk of having the Communists as the only war win-
ners in Croatia. It was clear that they had to take the initiative so that the 
HSS could regain its pre-war position as  Croatia’s strongest political party. 
Various combinations, which in 1943 and 1944 included contacts with both 
Ustashas and Communists, had the ultimate aim to outwit both movements 
and restore the HSS to power. But the leeway for independent actions had 
already been taken. As the following developments showed, in the war envi-
ronment, only active policy and force could prevail. 
The different war destinies of the HSS leaders and their different political 
estimates contributed to the non-homogeneity and inconsistency of HSS pol-
icy. During the war, Maček was the Ustashas’ captive under their close surveil-
lance. The detaining of Augustin Košutić, the Party’s Vice-President, in late 
1944, and the news of partisan terror against “the traitors”, was a clear message 
to Maček, who had for a long time been carrying the partisan label of traitor. 
That was referred to in Vjesnik, glasilo Jedinstvene narodnooslobodilačke fron-
te Hrvatske (Paper of the Unitary People’s Liberation Front of Croatia), and soon 
the traitor Executive Committee of the HRSS was also analysing that thesis. 
The Committee knew they had to leave Croatia before the partisans arrived in 
Zagreb, and they emigrated together with the Ustasha leadership.5 
5 Vjesnik, 26 Feb. 1944, “Put Mačeka - put izdaje” (“Maček’s Way – Way of Treason”); Slobodni 
dom, 8 Mar. 1944, Svim pristašama Hrvatske Seljačke Stranke” (“To all followers of the 
Croatian Peasant Party”).
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Maček did not have the possibility to influence HSS policy from abroad, 
except for sending secret messages in which he advised the HSS not to par-
ticipate in the elections for the Constituent Assembly of the Federal People’s 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija - FNRJ) in 
November 1945. He opposed the legalisation of the party, as it would mean the 
acknowledgement of the legitimacy of Communist power. Apart from that, 
he counted on the conflict between the East and the West soon, which would 
enable the HSS to restore its power. In his interview in the New York Times, on 
23 July 1945, Maček referred to the dictatorship of the Communist regime.6 
He sent a clear message to Šubašić and Juraj Šutej, members of the Yugoslav 
government with a Communist majority, that he was not supporting them, 
especially because he thought that the new regime in Croatia saw the HSS 
as its worst enemy.
 Košutić had some more leeway than Maček, as he was free most of the 
time. But when the Vokić-Lorković putsch failed, wishing to evade Pavelić’s 
manipulations, and having well assessed the final results of the war, he want-
ed to negotiate with the Communists.7 But they imprisoned him soon, in 
November 1944, after a similar attempt of Božidar Magovac, a respectable 
HSS member, to win an equal position for the HSS and limit the monopo-
ly of the KPJ in the partisan movement had been prevented in the spring 
and summer of that  same year. Having faced the KPJ’s dictatorial inten-
tions, Košutić returned to the Party’s original position: the wait-and-see pol-
icy. That in fact was Maček’s policy. As he was still kept in detention after 
the war, Košutić strongly influenced the Party’s policy through his wife Mira 
Košutić, Stjepan Radić’s daughter, and Narodni glas (People’s Voice), the HSS 
party paper. He opposed the legalisation of the party, and especially partic-
ipation in the elections for the Constituent Assembly of FNRJ, or any other 
activity. Namely, like Maček, he was convinced in the conflict between the 
communist East and the democratic West, and was counting on the return 
of the HSS after the victory of the West. 
Ivan Šubašić, Vice-Roy of the Autonomous Banovina of Croatia, had a 
special position among HSS leaders. Having been chosen by the British as 
the man for the uniting of all South-Slavic forces in the fight against the 
Germans, he was supposed to be an obstacle to  Communist predominance. 
Britain imposed him on the King and the Greater-Serbian forces, and  on 
the partisans as well.8 Britain believed that the Tito-Šubašić agreement pre-
served the interests of the Yugoslav Monarchy and prevented the absolute 
6 New York Times, 23 July 1945, “Maček prophesises Tito’s dictatorship. Claims that the 
Yugoslav Communist Regime is certain, but Croats will resist it”(“Maček prorokuje diktaturu 
Tita. Izjavljuje da je u Jugoslaviji komunistički režim siguran, ali Hrvati će se tome oduprijeti). 
See Dinko Šuljak, Tražio sam Radićevu Hrvatsku (I Sought Radić’s Croatia) (Barcelona – Munich: 
Library of Hrvatska revia, 1988), p. 409.
7 Z. Radelić, Hrvatska seljačka stranka 1941.-1950. (Croatian Peasant Party 1941-1950), p. 28.
8 On I. Šubašić’s Activities in Dragovan ŠEPIĆ, Vlada Ivana Šubašića (Ivan Šubašić’s 
Government) (Zagreb: Globus, 1983).
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prevalence of the KPJ. Šubašić was the only HSS politician with a tolera-
ble level of equality with the KPJ, at least in the formal sense. He participat-
ed in the coalition Communist-Royal government as the Foreign Minister, 
but the state policy was fully controlled by the Communists.  Unlike Košutić 
and Šutej, he had a more compromise-prone policy. He wanted the HSS and 
HRSS to unite and stand for the elections, but within the NF. 
 Šutej found himself in the same position as Šubašić. He too was a mem-
ber of the temporary government, but unlike Šubašić, he was in favour of a 
more determined policy. He insisted on resignations from the minister posi-
tions in the Communist government, but was in favour of the legalisation of 
the Party and the Party’s independent stand for the elections.
Full predominance of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia
The situation in the post-war Croatia was determined by the following 
facts: 1) the war between l941 and 1945, and the associated human casual-
ties and devastations; 2) the activities of the remaining Ustasha and some 
Chetnik forces after the war; 3) the collapse of the NDH and the restora-
tion of Yugoslavia; 4) the power of the KPJ, which enforced its dictatorship; 
5) Yugoslavia’s alliance with the USSR, which pushed back the influence of 
France, Great Britain and the United States of America, and the total discon-
tinuation of the Italian and German influence; 6) the expectation of the con-
flict between the communist East and the democratic West; 7) radical terri-
torial changes: in those changes, when compared with the situation in 1939, 
Croatia lost parts of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory and Srijem, and 
gained parts of its ethnic or historical territories, i.e. Baranja and Dvor na 
Uni, as well as Cres, Lastovo, Lošinj, Rijeka, Zadar and Istria; 8) the special 
position of Istria, which until 1947 was under military rule, when annexed 
to Croatia (Buje, Novigrad and Umag were annexed to Croatia in 1954).
The KPJ fully dominated the important institutions, the partisan move-
ment and the post-war government. The leader in the fight against the 
opposition was the Yugoslav intelligence, security and secret service called 
Department for the Protection of People (Odjeljenje zaštite naroda - OZN). 
It was founded to prevent any opposition activities against the Communist 
rule, both political and armed. OZNA was re-organised in March 1946, when 
the second OZNA section in charge of the organising of counter-intelligence 
network in the areas under partisan rule, evolved into the State Security 
Administration (Uprava državne bezbjednosti - UDB), and was transferred 
from the Ministry of People’s Defence into the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
as an autonomous department. Within the Yugoslav Army (Jugoslavenska 
armija - JA), the Counter-Intelligence Service (Kontraobavještajna služba - 
KOS) was formed from the third OZNA section. 
The same reasons for which Tito founded OZNA, made him found the 
People’s Defence Corps of Yugoslavia (Korpus narodne obrane Jugoslavije - 
KNOJ). Its task was to destroy “the enemies of the revolution”, to “clean” the 
partisan territory from “the gangs”, and to execute orders issued by OZNA. 
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In simple words, KNOJ was executing operations planned by OZNA. By the 
end of 1945, KNOJ had 120,000 soldiers. 
OZNA was functioning as a Party and a state organ in harmony with the 
unity of the Party and state authority. All OZNA members were KPJ mem-
bers as well. OZNA was in the forefront of the covered-up revolution car-
ried out by Communists until 1947/1948. Communists were carrying out 
the disguised revolution, hiding behind countless accusations against their 
opponents’ and wealthy citizens’ alleged co-operation with the occupying 
forces and their collaborators, by use of staged judicial proceedings, courts 
for the protection of national honour, military and civil courts, as well as 
currency reform, confiscation of property and seizure of war profits. 
Unlike those measures, open revolutionary actions were not hidden 
behind the accusations of enemy activities, but were rather the consequence 
of the KPJ’s decisiveness to reorganise  society on  new foundations, in line 
with the Communist vision. In terms of agriculture, this meant first of all 
a thorough agrarian reform and distribution of land to peasants in August 
1945, and after the conflict with the Cominform  – with the attempted col-
lectivisation through the introduction of collective farms. With the nation-
alisation in December 1946 and April 1948, the private sector in industry 
and related trades was almost completely abolished. The purpose of UDBA 
was to hinder not only the real enemies, but also all potential opponents, 
who might present an obstacle to the KPJ. 
Formal compromises of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia
But the full predominance of the KPJ was threatened by the pressure of 
the Allies, who insisted on the agreement with the royal government of Ivan 
Šubašić. Josip Broz Tito agreed to found a joint government consisting of the 
members of the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia (Nacionalni 
komitet oslobođenja Jugoslavije - NKOJ) and the royal government, on 7 
March 1945, which included royal governors, the expansion of the Anti-
Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), and elec-
tions three months after the end of the war. Although the Communists 
accepted most of the requests, in practice, it was boiled down to formalities, 
which did not jeopardise the realisation of the KPJ’s will. One can say that 
the Communists saved their dictatorship with those compromises, and then 
confirmed it by formal parliamentary means. 
The disunited Allies did not have the strength to remind KPJ of the obliga-
tions taken and the promises of democracy. At the Potsdam Conference (17 
July to 2 August 1945), Churchill put pressure on Stalin and Truman, remind-
ing them that the decisions from the  Yalta Conference ( 4–11 February 
1945),  where the major forces recognised the continuity of Yugoslavia, were 
not being carried out coherently, especially in relation to personal liberties, 
freedom of worship, speech, press, assembly and association, the right to 
property and private initiative, and the fact that free elections had not been 
held. Stalin stood against him, while Truman remained neutral. No decision 
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was made and the Potsdam Conference was nothing but disappointment to 
the opposition in Yugoslavia.
Nevertheless, the elections for the Constituent Assembly of FNRJ were 
held on 11 November 1945 and were supposed to be a crucial moment 
for the future of democracy and the system of government in Yugoslavia. 
Therefore, all political activities of the KPJ and the bourgeois opposition 
were concentrated in that direction.
HSS members in the Temporary People’s Assembly 
(7 – 26 August 1945)
During the Congress of National Front of Jugoslavia (Narodna fron-
ta Jugoslavije - NFJ) in August 1945, AVNOJ was finally broadened with 
the so-called undiscredited members of the pre-war National Assembly 
of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. But, the recommendation from the Yalta 
Conference on broadening AVNOJ with undiscredited members of the 
National Assembly of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was modified. According 
to the interpretation that the National Assembly was elected in 1938 under 
non-democratic circumstances - which was not mentioned in Yalta - a con-
clusion was made on the broadening of AVNOJ not only with a certain 
number of pre-war members, but also with members of the existing politi-
cal parties and groups, and the prominent public persons and persons from 
cultural circles, and all that in order to have as many Communist sympathis-
ers as possible. 
The Temporary People’s Assembly (7 – 26 August 1945) included twenty-
six representatives on behalf of the HSS, who together with the old AVNOJ 
members from the HRSS, made a group of thirty-seven. Out of the twenty-
six newlyelected members, half of them belonged to the HSS group around 
Šubašić, and the rest of them were nominated by the HRSS. 
Croatian Republican Peasant’s Party
After the Communists assumed power in 1945, the Executive Committee 
of the HRSS participated in the government, under KPJ supervision. By 
doing that, they knowingly gave up their Party’s autonomy. The HRSS was 
turned into the KPJ’s instrument in the elimination of the HSS, as well as the 
elimination of pluralism and the multi-party parliamentary system. 
The HRSS served the Communists, as proof of a multi-party system and 
democracy, and that there was no KPJ dictatorship. At the same time, the 
pro-Communist HRSS was supposed to channel HSS followers and their 
aspirations for the party’s restoration. Therefore, the Communists used the 
HRSS for the purposes of the pre-election for the Constituent Assembly 
of FNRJ in 1945, as well as for the Constituent Assembly of the People’s 
Republic of Croatia (Narodna Republika Hrvatska - NRH) in 1946. In short, 
the Communist authorities were supporting the HRSS, whose public sup-
port was very weak, as long as they needed it to become strong enough by 
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creating a repressive apparatus, and to obtain full international recognition. 
After that, the HRSS was discarded and put down.
Šubašić, HSS and HRSS
Šubašić found himself between the HSS and the HRSS. He thought the 
best solution would be to unite the two, and to have Maček resign. Soon, 
talks started with the HRSS leadership on the unification of the parties. The 
representatives of the HSS and the HRSS were supposed to appear together 
at the Temporary People’s Assembly, and then the two parties would unite. 
Despite the unacceptable conditions, the talks continued until September 
1945. Namely, the IO HRSS, almost certainly prompted by the Communists, 
was exclusivist in the talks with HSS leaders. Instead of unification, they pro-
posed that HSS members join the HRSS, naturally under the criteria defined 
by the IO HRSS. In that way, the destiny of the HSS would, of course, have 
come into the hands of the KPJ leadership. Apart from that, the IO HRSS 
demanded that HSS followers join the NF instantly. It was clear that the 
KPJ and its people in the IO HRSS wanted to prevent the revival of the 
HSS, in fact, to dissolve it and replace it by the HRSS, which was in fact a 
Communist Party for Croatian peasants. 
Only HSS representatives in AVNOJ, who by that very fact expressed their 
willingness to co-operate even in a discriminated position, supported Šubašić. 
Šubašić’s idea was formally equal to the one of the HRSS, or the KPJ, and he 
saw the united HSS joining the NF as an “association of parties”. He believed 
that in time there would be only two parties left: a peasant party – the HSS, 
and a labour party – the KPJ. But Tito explained to him that the NF would be 
an “association of individuals”, rather than political parties.9 Of course, Šubašić 
did not know what that meant, and the only possible meaning was the melting 
away of all parties in the NF, except, of course, the leading KPJ. 
Many public statements about democracy and freedom, given by 
the Communists during the war and the post-war period, as well as the 
negotiations under the supervision of Great Britain, were denied by the 
Communists themselves; 10 not only with their actions, but also in many 
statements. Namely, although Tito publicly rejected the accusations of the 
creation of a single-party system, at the same time he said that the restora-
tion of the old parties was out of question. Besides, the fact that he was the 
General Secretary of the KPJ, President of the Government and the Supreme 
Commander of the JA, as well as the President of the NFJ, confirmed that 
conclusion.  
9 On the NF, see Katarina Spehnjak, Javnost i propaganda. Narodna fronta u politici i kulturi 
Hrvatske 1945.-1952. (Public and Propaganda) (Zagreb: Croatian Institute of History, 2002).
10 See Vojislav Koštunica and Kosta Čavoški, Stranački pluralizam ili monizam (Party 
Pluralism and Monism) (Ljubljana: Tribuna, special edition, 27 November 1987).
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Conference of Croatian Peasant Party leaders at the Esplanade 
Hotel in Zagreb
The failure of the negotiations on the unification of the HSS and the HRSS 
motivated Šubašić to clarify the relations with HSS leaders and to summon a 
party conference in Zagreb. The conference was to define the party’s further 
actions. It was held at the Esplanade Hotel in Zagreb on 2 September 1945.11 
Šubašić issued three requests to the participants: to unite the HSS and the 
HRSS, to join the united HSS with the NF, and to stand for the elections. 
The participants present were appalled at the fact that he did not even men-
tion Maček and his escape out of fear of persecution; he did not mention that 
Košutić was imprisoned without a court decision and that many party mem-
bers were victims of the regime, even those who had been trying to co-oper-
ate with the regime. Many conference participants held Šubašić responsible 
because, as a member of the government, he had not prevented the violence 
of the regime. They demanded his resignation unless he could influence the 
change of the situation.
In fact, two opposing views were manifested there. The majority was in 
favour of Šubašić and Šutej’s resignation from their positions in the govern-
ment and opposed the idea of standing for the elections together with the 
HRSS, and even less as a part of the NF.  They strongly advised that the HSS 
should go into opposition. Only a minority was in favour of co-operation with 
the NF. But Šutej offered a compromise solution and requested that Šubašić 
visit Maček in Paris, obtain Košutić’s opinion on recent events and get him out 
of prison.
Nevertheless, the KPJ’s assessment was that Košutić’s release from prison 
before the elections for the Constituent Assembly might jeopardise their plans 
for the elimination of the HSS, and thus Košutić’s release was made condition-
al on some compromises. He was almost certainly requested to link the party 
with the NF or, possibly, to withdraw from politics. Košutić obviously did not 
accept the ultimatum, and was kept in detention for two years without judi-
cial proceedings. 
Šubašić’s and Šutej’s resignations
Šubašić was supported by a few like-minded individuals, especially those 
who were occupying positions in Belgrade and who were representatives in the 
Temporary People’s Assembly (Franjo Gaži, Tomo Jančiković). But he accept-
ed the decision that he had to go to Paris to meet Maček and inform him on 
the difficult situation. Although in fear of causing additional repression and 
Yugoslavia’s full turning to the USSR, the British let Šubašić use an airplane. 
11 For more see Z. Radelić, Hrvatska seljačka stranka 1941.-1950. (Croatian Peasant Party 1941-
1950), pp. 54-60; Z. Radelić, “Konferencija prvaka HSS-a u hotelu Esplanade u Zagrebu 1945.” 
(“Conference of HSS Leaders at the Esplanade Hotel in Zagreb 1945”), Časopis za suvremenu 
povijest (in further text: ČSP) 25 (1993), No. 2-3: 149-164.
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But, the day before the flight, on 10 September 1945, the Vice-President of the 
Government, Edvard Kardelj, notified Šubašić that the authorities would not 
let him leave the country. In the evening that day, Šubašić had a brain stroke.
Within a month or two, Šubašić suffered several very difficult blows: in 
August 1945, the world’s major forces at the Potsdam Conference failed to put 
a pressure on the KPJ in order to fully implement the Tito-Šubašić Agreement; 
King Petar II Karađorđević denied the governor the right of representation; 
Milan Grol, Vice-President of the Government resigned; the leaders of the 
Serbian bourgeois in emigration were planning to send a memorandum con-
demning the Yugoslav government’s policy to the Conference of foreign minis-
ters in London, in September 1945; and the Bishops’ Conference of Yugoslavia 
published the Shepherd’s Letter containing serious accusations due to the per-
secutions of the Catholic Church (Katolička crkva - KC). Aware that he was 
left without anyone’s support and persuaded by Šutej, they both resigned on 
8 October 1945.
A strong American and British reaction was missing. They were afraid of 
causing the Communist regime’s counter-reaction and totally leave Yugoslavia 
to the USSR’s sphere of interest. Therefore, on 6 November 1945, weakly word-
ed notes were sent expressing disapproval of the breach of the Agreement. 
After the elections, on 17 November 1945, Tito’s response followed. He reject-
ed the objections, claiming that all the items of the Agreement were fulfilled. 
He clearly made known that after the resignations and the electoral victory of 
the NF, “the allied governments were released from their obligations they con-
sidered to have towards the people of Yugoslavia”.12
The group gathered around Narodni glas
The Party leaders gathered around Mira Košutić were enforcing the policy 
of Vice-President Košutić, who was requesting the Party’s full freedom in its 
actions. The public was informed of that standpoint through the party paper 
Narodni glas (People’s Voice). Narodni glas čovječnosti, pravice i slobode (People’s 
Voice of Humaneness, Justice and Freedom) was the result of the work of the 
group around Mira Košutić and Marija Radić, the publisher, and the manag-
ing editor and editor-in-chief, Ivan Bernardić. Apart from illegal leaflets, it was 
the only source of information in Croatia not under regime control. The first 
and the only issue of Narodni glas were printed on 20 October 1945.13
The distribution of the first issue was prohibited based on the accusation 
of haranguing the accomplishments of the People’s Liberation War, causing 
national hatred and advocating the enemy’s activities. As Bernardić continued 
to work on the second issue, the Communist authorities used illegal means 
putting pressure on the printing workers in order to hinder the paper’s pub-
12 Željko Krušelj and Jera Vodušek Starič, ed., “Jugoslavija u britanskim izvještajima 1945-50” 
(“Yugoslavia in British Reports 1945-50”), Danas, 23 May 1989.
13 Find more in Zdenko Radelić, “Narodni glas - glas oporbe 1945.” (“People’s Voice – 
Opposition Voice”) ČSP 26 (1994), No. 2: 299-315.
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lishing. Thus, according to Vjesnik, the workers of the People’s Printing House 
refused to print Narodni glas because it was “reactionary”. After 22 August 
1945, when a group of young Communists broke into Radić’s bookstore on 
Jurišićeva Street, which was a gathering point of Mira Košutić’s group, and 
smashed pictures of Radić and Maček, a bomb exploded on 13 November 
1945 in front of the bookstore and served as a serious enough warning. The 
editorial staff had to give up further issuing of Narodni glas. 
Narodni glas defined free activities as the main precondition for the func-
tioning of the HSS. The paper rejected the regime’s claim that Radić’s pro-
gramme was realised under KPJ leadership, and denounced the HRSS’s sub-
servience to the KPJ. It openly stated that the KPJ had introduced dictator-
ship and that it was persecuting its political opponents falsely accusing them 
of being fascists. The paper also underlined that there were no personal liber-
ties, freedom of private property, and that federal units, Croatia being one of 
them, did not have any actual competences. Finally, having warned the read-
ers that the people’s free will would not be expressed in the elections for the 
Constituent Assembly, Narodni glas called for abstention.
Croatian Peasant’s Party and the elections
The elections were held on 11 November 1945, and the government’s 
response to the opposition parties’ boycott was the introduction of ballot-
boxes without a list. That was to provide the constituency with the possi-
bility to choose and to ensure democratic rules, and at the same time, to 
guarantee secrecy in voting. The NF won a landslide victory, with about 90 
% of votes out of 90 % of voters who went to the polls. The official results 
are of course disputable, having in mind the circumstances in which the 
elections were held. The election campaign was totally in the hands of the 
KPJ, which controlled trade unions, state-owned companies, the press and 
radio. Besides, the organisation of polling stations, election boards, voting 
lists and vote counting were in its hands. The opposition could not control 
vote counting. In many regions people were forced to go to the polls, but at 
the same time secrecy in voting was not guaranteed. The army and other 
governmental representatives threatened those who did not want to go the 
polls, in some cases even with death. The boxes without a list were called 
“the Ustasha boxes” or “the black boxes”. Many boxes had narrow openings 
so that the rubber balls could be heard falling into them. In some cases, the 
balls were moved from the box without a list to the NF box.
Dispute concerning the registration of the HSS
At the time of the elections and afterwards, the fundamental question for 
the HSS was whether to register the party or not. According to the Law on 
associating, gathering and other public meetings of 25 August 1945, the par-
ties intending to renew their activities had to register. There were two ways 
to register a party: by the declaration on joining the NF or by submitting 
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the request, programme and statute of the party to the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs.14
Due to the opposing concepts of the party’s policy, another party confer-
ence was summoned, which was held at the Priests’ Home in Palmotićeva 
Street in Zagreb on 15 November 1945. The participants were supposed to 
make a decision on whether to register the party or not. The majority was 
in favour of registering because they considered legalisation to be crucial 
for public work in politics, and that it would also facilitate contacts with 
foreign diplomats. Besides, the government might identify the HSS with 
the Ustashas and Chetniks, because of its illegal functioning. Those who 
opposed legalisation were saying that only Košutić and Maček could decide 
on such an important issue. The final conclusion was to ask Vice-President 
Košutić for his opinion on the matter.  Shortly thereafter, Košutić sent them 
a secret letter in which he was decisively against the registering of the HSS. 
Relations with Serbian and Slovenian oppositions
At the time of the Temporary People’s Assembly in August 1945, many 
representatives of Yugoslav opposition parties were pursuing their joint 
action. The HSS representatives favoured the idea of co-operation among 
the peasant parties (HRSS, HSS, People’s Peasant Party and Farmers’ 
Federation). There were two proposals: to establish a Peasant-Socialist Bloc 
(HSS, Farmers’ Federation and Socialist Party) or Peasant-Democratic Bloc 
(HSS, Democratic Party, Radical Party, Slovene People’s Party, Socialist 
Party and Farmers’ Federation), outside the NF. In spring 1946, an initia-
tive was launched for the founding of the Peasant Representatives’ Club at 
the People’s Assembly of FNRJ, or rather the Peasant Bloc. In May 1946, 
such schemes also included Imro Filaković, an HRSS representative, and 
Father Ante Salacan, as a so-called independent representative in the NF. 
Dissatisfied with the IO HRSS policy, they were looking for contacts with 
the HSS group around Šubašić and Šutej. But, unexpectedly, none of the 
other HRSS representatives wanted to sign the declaration on joining the 
Peasant Club. 
In July 1946, at the time of the FNRJ People’s Assembly session, Imro 
Filaković, Father Salacan and Dragoljub Jovanović and his People’s Peasant 
Party restored the idea of establishing the Peasant Club and the Peasant Bloc 
(HSS, Peasant Party, Peoples Peasant Party, Farmers’ Federation, Slovene 
People’s Party and a group of peasant representatives from Macedonia). But, 
nothing came of that due to the disunity within the parties and Communist 
repression. Nevertheless, occasional contacts among party leaders were 
being maintained until the beginning of 1947. Opposition actions in the 
14 See in Momčilo Pavlović, “Politički programi Demokratske, Narodne radikalne, 
Jugoslovenske republikanske demokratske, Socijalističke i Socijal-demokratske stranke 
Jugoslavije iz 1945. godine” (“Political Programmes of the Democratic, National Radical, 
Yugoslav Republican Democratic, Socialist, an Social-Democratic Parties in Yugoslavia, in 
1945”) Istorija XX veka (Belgrade: 1985), No. 1: 119-155.
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People’s Assembly were reduced to occasional discussions of individuals 
who had some courage to speak against the draft laws. The last appearance 
of that kind was the one of Filaković, who was expelled from the HRSS in 
1946, after his protest against the re-introduction of boxes without a list in 
January 1950.15
Maček’s message
Maček was communicating with the HSS in the country through his 
secret channels. In spring 1946, Šutej made a written report, which was sent 
to Maček in Paris, through the French consul or American vice-consul in 
Zagreb. In July 1946, Gaži sent a verbal message to Maček, with the con-
sent of Jančiković and Šutej, through an official of the Yugoslav Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. He warned him that the HSS had to be reactivated as soon 
as possible, as time was not on the Party’s side. He also said that the HSS 
could not function with its leadership abroad and in prison. He requested 
Maček’s consent for the establishing of a new temporary HSS leadership. 
Finally, in July and September 1946, Maček’s replies arrived. He sent  word 
that the HSS should not be registered and that the party should not co-oper-
ate with the KPJ, either within or outside the NF. He also said that the party 
should be linked with other peasant parties in the country, in a future peas-
ant bloc. He was encouraging his party colleagues, saying that that situation 
was only temporary and that the USA and Great Britain would support the 
democratic forces.
August Košutić’s releasment from prison 
The Communist government controlled all those contacts because some 
leading HSS people were collaborating with OZNA, even those who were 
very close to Maček. OZNA knew of the attempts made by Šutej, Gaži and 
Jančiković to activate the Party. It also knew, of course, of Košutić’s opinion 
related to the elections. As the 1946 elections for the Constituent Assembly 
of the NRH were approaching, there appeared the risk that Šutej’s concept 
would prevail and that the HSS would stand for the elections. It was decid-
ed that Košutić would be released from prison. When he was pursuing an 
active policy, OZNA was afraid of his influence, now, to the contrary, his 
return to the wait-and-see policy of expecting some favourable internation-
al circumstances was suitable to them.
Immediately after his release on 6 September 1946, he took over the lead-
ership of the Party. Šutej convinced him that the registration of the party 
was necessary because that was the only way to gather party leaders, act 
against the NF and stand for the elections for the Constituent Assembly. 
But Košutić remained true to his and Maček’s position of not registering the 
15 Z. Radelić, Hrvatska seljačka stranka 1941.-1950., pp. 178-182.; Z. Radelić, Izvršni odbor 
Hrvatske republikanske seljačke stranke i njegovi otpadnici (1945.-1948.) (Executive Committee 
of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party and Its Recreants), ČSP 24 (1992), No. 2: 59-81, 64.
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party and not organizing any political activities, because they would pro-
voke repression. He believed that time was on their side and that, in time, 
the Croatian people would stand by the side of the HSS.
Božidar Magovac and his concept of HSS policy
Magovac justified his joining the partisans not only with the necessity of 
fight against the Ustasha regime and the occupiers, but also with the attempt 
to prevent the risk of the KPJ assuming unlimited power by means of the lib-
eration war.16 He wanted to win an equal position for the HSS through his 
participation in the partisan movement. But, contrary to his original inten-
tions, he facilitated the creation of a new party leadership, which had preten-
sions to take the HSS into its hands, in fact, into the hands of the KPJ. 
Magovac managed for some time to resist the pressure to establish a new 
leadership and to accuse Maček of treason, but even when he publicly dis-
carded Maček, he insisted on the autonomy of the IO HSS. Partnership with-
in the partisan movement was unacceptable to the KPJ, and in the spring 
and summer of 1944 Magovac was relieved from all of his party and states-
man’s duties, such as the position of Vice-President of NKOJ. 
Nevertheless, despite the bitter experience, he decided to engage in poli-
tics again after the war. He thought the KPJ would be forced to accept his co-
operation in order to get support from the Croatian people, with his own and 
Šubašić’s help. In such way, he believed, the KPJ would solve a very difficult 
political and economic situation in the country, which was a result of the ravag-
August Košutić
16 On B. Magovac see in Zdenko Radelić, Božidar Magovac, S Radićem između Mačeka i 
Hebranga (Božidar Magovac, With Radić Between Maček and Hebrang) (Zagreb: Croatian 
Institute of History, Dom i svijet, 1999).
243
 Review of Croatian History 1/2005, no.1., 227-251
es of war, but also of the revolutionary terror and radical economic reforms. He 
was convinced that the war between the West and the USSR was unavoidable, 
and , for that reason, it was absolutely necessary to have the HSS in power, apart 
from the Communists, in  those decisive moments. He was counting on the vic-
tory of the USA and Great Britain. His idea was to take power with Šubašić’s 
help and then give it over to Maček. Of course, constant calls of the HSS lead-
ership to follow him were not the consequence of his faithfulness to Maček, 
but rather of the assessment that the President of the Party enjoyed a high rep-
utation among Croats. In  1943 and 1946, outside and regardless of the party, 
Magovac saw himself as the forerunner of the HSS leadership. After Šubašić’s 
passivity, beginning in the summer of 1946, the two of them had meetings at 
least once a month. Magovac was convinced that the two of them, as sincere 
partisan allies, would be the most acceptable persons for co-operation. 
Dissatisfied with HSS policy, Magovac insisted on the renewal of talks with 
the KPJ, and that this time, unlike the elections for the Constituent Assembly 
of FNRJ, the HSS should stand for the elections for the Constituent Assembly 
of the NRH. But, instead of the whole party’s candidacy, which was unaccepta-
ble to the KPJ, only the party’s most prominent individuals should run for the 
elections. To that aim, on 5 October 1946, Magovac drafted a special document 
under the working title Nacrt (Draft), in which he presented his basic propo-
sitions. Its essence was the request that the KPJ should acknowledge the right 
to change the law in the “parliamentary-democratic” way, in order to avoid a 
civil war, as implicitly said. In the end, he openly requested that the constitu-
tionally guaranteed civil liberties be respected.17 Košutić accepted the Draft, 
considering that the possible success of Magovac and Šubašić might be useful 
Božidar Magovac in 1943. 
Drawing by Božidar Jakac.
17 Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti (Croatian academy of sciences and arts), 
Archive, RO B. Magovac, XI.
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to the HSS as well, but he insisted that the HSS was not to be involved in it. In 
October 1946, Šubašić took Magovac’s Draft to Bakarić and Krajačić, mem-
bers of the Croatian Government and Politburo of the Central Committee 
(Ceentralni komitet - CK) of the KPH. They firmly rejected the proposal to 
allow non-Communists to stand for the elections. 
Moreover, the Communist leaders became anxious about the opposition 
activities of the HSS and their ambitions. A CK KPJ session was summoned 
in early 1947. It was decided that more severe measures would be taken 
against them. The decision was followed by arrests and judicial proceed-
ings against active HSS members, such as Tomo Baburić, Franjo Gaži, Tomo 
Jančiković, Andrija Papo, Andrija Pavlić, Ivan Štefanec, Dr. Karlo Žunjević and 
a large group of students, all HSS members.
That did not demoralise Magovac or Šubašić. When the Draft failed, they 
started another initiative in July 1947. They wanted to suggest for the KPJ 
to appoint Šubašić “the President of the Presidium” of the Parliament or “the 
Prime-Minister of Croatia”, and Magovac a minister in the federal govern-
ment. They intended to issue some other requests to the Communists, such as 
announcement of political amnesty, abolition of the death penalty, discontin-
uation of state violence and free elections. Košutić again accepted Magovac’s 
initiative, although in this case, as well as in 1946, he was emphasising that 
Magovac and Šubašić were doing it on their own behalf only, and not on behalf 
of the HSS. He still believed that the HSS had to boycott the regime and wait 
for the intervention of the West. But Magovac was arrested in August 1947, 
bringing an end to his political activities. 
The government’s decisive actions put an end to all oppositional activities 
in the country, despite the fact that there were some short-term indications 
that the situation arisen from the Cominform Resolution (1948) would facil-
itate the liberalisation of the Communist regime, especially in relation to the 
new elections for the People’s Assembly of the FNRJ and NRH Parliament 
(Sabor) in 1950, and also in 1951, when the police found out that Šutej, with 
Šubašić’s assistance, was drafting a memorandum on the situation in the coun-
try for the representatives of the Western countries.18 
The Communist authorities occasionally arrested HSS leaders, and many of 
them, like Šubašić and Šutej, were under close police supervision, being fol-
lowed and tapped. Thus, the KPJ, in numerous judicial proceedings and other 
forms of repression in 1947 and 1948, totally destroyed the HSS in the coun-
try. The belief of its officials that a moderate and passive policy would bring 
about results proved to be wrong, at least for several decades to come. 
Catholic Church
After the victory in the liberation and civil war, and its assuming power, 
the KPJ’s ambition was to assume total control over political life. In Croatia, 
18 Hrvatski državni arhiv (Croatian State Archives) (in further text: HDA), MUP, 010-37, 
box 15, Dr. Juraj Šutej.
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apart from the HSS and other parties, armed resistance of the Crusaders 
and some Chetniks, the KPJ saw the Catholic Church as a possible gather-
ing point of oppositional political forces and the strongest ideological oppo-
nent. As the KPJ wanted to control all aspects of life and influence the pop-
ulation’s worldview, it considered religion to be an unscientific world view 
and an illusion, which caused man’s alienation and hindered his full engage-
ment in the creation of the new society. Apart from that, Communists were 
convinced that in a multi-national state churches and religions provided 
fertile ground for hatred among nations. As it was dealing with a church, 
a non-political institution with an enormous influence on people, the 
regime could not expose it to the usual prohibitions, and even less abol-
ish it. Freedom of worship, and the international situation as well, had to be 
accounted for. For that very reason, Communists often accused the Catholic 
Church of co-operating with enemy authorities and of being a class-enemy, 
abusing religious feelings and jeopardising the people’s government. A thou-
sand-year-old policy of the Catholic Church under the slogan “Caesar’s to 
Caesar, and God’s to God”, which had also been applied in the NDH, proved 
to be an excellent excuse for exposing the Church to the KPJ’s will, by cease-
less new accusations stemming from the previous war. Because of the KC’s 
unwillingness to follow Communist demands, Tito instigated the state appa-
ratus into adding new accusations, concerning the support to the Crusade 
movement after the war, to the previously existing accusations of co-opera-
tion with the Ustashas during the war. 
The fight against the Catholic Church was unscrupulous. The freedom of 
the priests’ activities was limited, and the credulity of some priests in their 
contacts with the Crusaders made the work of UDBA easier. On the other 
hand, many priests were avoiding such contacts, and UDBA was using the 
former Crusaders and its agents to set up cases. The authorities were espe-
cially interested in compromising Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, in order to 
force him into co-operation. All the accusations against him were related to 
the name of his secretary Ivan Šalić, and were exploited in such extent that 
the Communist regime promoted them into Crusader leaders. 
The accusations related to the Crusaders were reduced to the following: 
the hosting of the Ustasha colonel Erich Lisak at the Archbishop’s home, 
receiving letters from the Ustasha Colonel Anto Moškov, gathering of med-
icines for the Crusaders, and finally, consecration of the Crusaders’ flag. 
The consecration of the flag at the Archbishop’s chapel was the crucial evi-
dence of the conspiracy of the Archbishop of Zagreb and the Crusaders.19 
The Crusaders’ flag was consecrated on 21 October 1945, and was, alleged-
ly, intended for the Crusader group of Martin Mesarov, a former HSS repre-
sentative, which in fact did not exist. The whole case was staged by UDBA, 
19 For more see in Zdenko Radelić, “Komunisti, križari i Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj 1945.-
1946. godine” (“Communists, Crusaders and the Catholic Church in Croatia, 1945-1946”), 
in: Hans-Georg Fleck and Igor Graovac, ed., Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara, 2, Pecs, 19-21 
November 1999 (Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2000), pp. 583-600.
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at that time still OZNA. The operation lasted from mid 1945 until December 
1945, when OZNA killed Mesarov and planted the body to the police as if 
he was killed in combat. 
When the judicial proceedings were launched against Lisak, Šalić and oth-
ers, who had been arrested in November 1945, Stepinac was arrested as well, 
on 23 September 1946, and the indictment against Stepinac was extended 
and the proceedings were merged. The Public Prosecutor of NRH, Jakov 
Blažević, claimed that during the Bishops’ Conference and the Shepherd’s 
Letter, around 20 September 1945, Šalić’s “central group” was established, 
which was related to the Crusaders. In less than twenty days, on 11 October 
1946, the sentence was pronounced to Stepinac and others, and the accusa-
tion on the conspiracy between Stepinac and the Crusaders was one of the 
most absurd accusations in the indictment. 
The actual reason for Stepinac’s persecution was the Shepherd’s Letter 
issued by the Bishop’s Conference, on 20 September 1945, prior to the 
elections for the Constituent Assembly. In the Communists’ view, the let-
ter falsely presented the situation and encouraged Ustashas and the rest of 
the opposition to continue more actively with their terrorist activities. The 
Communist authorities sought to compromise the Catholic Church by asso-
ciating the Shepherd’s Letter with the Crusaders’ guerrilla activities. The let-
ter contained a number of serious accusations against the authorities, and 
the gravest of them was that the new government had killed or imprisoned 
501 priests during and after the war. 
The basic intention of the judicial proceedings was to portray the 
Crusaders in the most negative light and to associate such picture of them 
with the Catholic Church, and thus provoke public fury against its hier-
archy. The political motivation of the Crusader’s activities was not men-
tioned, not only to demotivate possible new sympathisers, but also to use 
the Crusaders in vilifying the Catholic Church, and thus limit its independ-
ence. But the Catholic Church, except for few individuals, was not engaged 
on the Crusaders’ side. On the other hand, due to the KPJ’s intention to 
subject the Church to its total control, many priests saw the restoration of 
Yugoslavia and the KPJ in power as a threat to the religious interests of the 
Croatian nation, and thus to the nation itself, which was the likely reason 
why some of them sympathised with the Crusaders’ endeavours. 
Orthodox Church and Communists
The KPJ’s persecution was directed against all religious congregations 
in Croatia, but there were no serious conflicts with the Serb Orthodox 
Church (Srpska pravoslavna crkva - SPC). In those days Tito himself con-
firmed “Loyalty” and “patriotism” of the Orthodox clergy, as opposed to the 
“unseemliness” of the Catholic prelates.20 One can presume that there was 
no conflict because the SPC was supporting the new authorities in relation 
20 Josip Broz Tito, Govori i članci (Speeches and Articles) (Zagreb), pp. 281-283.
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to the NDH and the restoration of Yugoslavia, and the reuniting of Serbs in a 
single state, the main motivation of the political engagement of that Church, 
weakening its political commitment. Besides, there are many indications of 
the popularisation of the KPJ among the Serbs in Croatia, who had been par-
ticipating in the partisan movement in a percentage much larger than their 
share in the population. That probably resulted in their ateisation and weak-
ened influence of the SPC. Thus, the different attitude of the KPJ towards 
the KC and the SPC was in fact the consequence of the different attitudes of 
the two Churches towards the Communist authorities and Yugoslavia. For 
example, according to UDBA’s data, two thirds of Orthodox priests joined 
the priest association founded by the regime, whose task was to co-oper-
ate with the authorities through the NF. In contrast, a “large majority” of the 
Catholic Church clergy was “reactionary and imbued with hatred for the 
people’s government”.21 That is why the authorities’ perceptions of the two 
Churches were different, and thus the accusations as well. 
Anti-Communist Guerrillas
Apart from the political activities, the Communist regime was troubled 
by the armed resistance as well, especially the one of the Crusaders.22 They 
were formed mostly as a result of the spontaneous gathering of soldiers of 
the armed forces of the NDH after their rout in 1945. Having abandoned the 
compromised Ustasha titles and symbols, the Crusaders fought against the 
Communist government and Yugoslavia, and for the restoration of the NDH. 
Anti-Communism, anti-Yugoslavism and the independent state of Croatia 
were their motivation to continue with the struggle. Many Crusaders count-
ed on Ante Pavelić’s return, and many hoped that Maček might become the 
leader of the Croatian nation. Upon the disintegration of the NDH and the 
defeat of the Ustashas’ ally, the Third Reich, the political orientation of the 
emigrated NDH leaders and Crusaders became pro-Western. They were 
counting on the alliance with the USA and Great Britain, which broke the 
war alliance with the USSR. The leadership of the NDH emphasised that the 
priority of its fight had been and remained the Croatian state. They   denied 
any association to fascism or a Nazi-type system. 
The Crusaders were not a compact military force. They were active in 
more than 200 unrelated groups, without real commanders or political lead-
ership. The NDH leadership abroad intended to unite them into one move-
ment, the Croatian National Resistance, by organising an operation under a 
symbolic name Akcija 10. travnja (Operation April 10th). They believed the 
Crusaders would be the striking force, which would restore the state, but 
21 HDA, not organised, UDB reports and enemy activities, 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948 
(Hostile activities of priests. Activities of religious organisations in 1947).
22 For more see in: Zdenko Radelić, Križari – gerila u Hrvatskoj (Crusaders – Guerrilla in 
Croatia) (Zagreb: Croatian Institute of History, Dom i svijet, 2002).
248
Z. RADELI∆, Opposition in Croatia 1945-1950  
the attempt was prevented by UDBA’s operation Gvardijan in the summer 
of 1948. 
The most intensive Crusaders’ activities were recorded after the military 
defeat in 1945 and 1946. As early as winter 1946/1947, most of the Crusader 
groups dissembled or were destroyed. In 1947, most of them disappeared and 
the remaining groups were struggling for mere survival. The last Crusader 
actions were recorded in 1952, when the last group was formed. One can say 
that, as the war between the democratic West and the Communist East did 
not occur, the guerrilla movement did not get the assistance they expected, 
and was destroyed by the decisive strikes of the Communist government. 
The Crusader groups normally had five to ten members. Larger groups 
were rare. In fact, there were few groups organised in a military manner with 
a command hierarchy and strict rules of conduct. They mainly attacked col-
lective farms, as a symbol of Communism, but also because they were one of 
the main supply sources. They  often attacked Communist activists, and more 
rarely police patrols. By intercepting individuals, occasionally blocking  roads 
and attacking  collective farms and private houses, the Crusaders were creat-
ing the conditions  for a state of emergency for a number of years after the 
war. Although they were using the absence of the regime’s units to move free-
ly in some villages, the Crusaders did not have territories under their control. 
The Crusader groups were active in villages only, which they used for supplies 
and as shelters. Armed operations in cities were rare. Based on  the place of 
their origin and activities, as well as the origin of the movement members, the 
Crusaders were a rural guerrilla force. In the cities, there illegal organizations 
were recorded, which  wrote slogans,  tore down posters and other propagan-
da material, and some of them even armed themselves.  The urban members 
were mainly high-school and university students. 
According to UDBA’s calculations, by 1 July 1948 in Croatia, there were 
3,688 guerrilla fighters. That figure included active and passive guerrilla 
fighters, the so-called “bunkers” and accomplices, but also a small number 
of Chetniks. An approximate number of participants in the armed struggle 
in Croatia, in the period 1945-1950, was between 3,500 and 4,000. As time 
went on, their numbers went going down, from 2,500 guerrilla fighters in 
1945, to 540 in 1946, 510 in 1947, 243 in 1948, and ten in 1949. After 1950, 
there were less than ten of them, and they completely disappeared in 1952. 
Unlike the Crusaders, who were active on the whole territory of Croatia, 
except for Istria and Dalmatian coast, (but including the area at the foot of 
the Velebit mountain range), Chetnik activities were recorded in areas with 
a larger portion of Serb population.  Groups with a monarchist orientation 
were also mostly active in Međimurje, along the Slovenian border. There is 
no precise data on the total number of Chetniks in Croatia after the war. 
Immediately after the war, there were several hundred of them, but as early 
as autumn 1945, there were no more than seventy of them. To illustrate their 
force we can use the data pertaining to Lika. The earliest estimates in 1945 
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spoke of 350 Chetniks, and by autumn that year, there were only sixty-three 
remaining. 
In Croatia, Chetnik guerrillas were much weaker than Ustasha guerrillas, 
and in fact they were not a real threat to the Communist government. The sit-
uation slightly changed in the late 1940s due to resistance to the Communist 
measures in rural areas. Nevertheless, those social movements or peasant 
rebellions in Kordun and Banovina, with the recorded traces of Serb national-
ism, were only short-lived. They were suppressed in their early beginnings by 
the government’s efficient measures, and the dissatisfaction was also tempered 
by the abandonment of the most radical measures in villages. 
The Communist government dealt drastically with the Crusaders and 
Chetniks. It organised search parties, traps and raids in villages. Apart from 
threatening and physically mistreating Crusaders’ families, the government 
took drastic measures of relocating them to two camps created specifically 
for that purpose.  The proclamation of amnesty in the summer of 1945 also 
influenced the decision to surrender by many guerrilla fighters and those 
who were in hiding out of fear of retribution by the Communist victors. 
It is important to emphasise that in the fight against all their political 
opponents, the Communists were eagerly accusing them of being Crusaders 
and Chetniks.  It is undisputable that many accusations against HSS mem-
bers and the Catholic clergy, as well as the Archbishop of Zagreb Stepinac, of 
being linked with the Crusaders, were designed by the Communist leaders 
and carried out under UDBA’s directions. In that way, they could get even 
with their opponents very efficiently and create an area wide enough to 
restructure the society without fear of any opposition party or movement.  
Conclusion
The process of stratification of the HSS, which had many characteristics 
of a national movement, was sped up by the establishment of the NDH, but 
also of the partisan movement under the Communist Party leadership, as 
well as the rising against the Ustasha regime and the resistance to the Axis. 
The HSS was totally disoriented in the period following the war. Vladko 
Maček, with some other party leaders, emigrated to France, and then to the 
USA, having estimated that that was the best solution in his attempts to 
influence the political developments in the country. The group influenced 
by Košutić followed Maček’s attitude. As they had earlier renounced the 
Ustasha regime, they also renounced all the requirements of the Communist 
regime. They demanded the full introduction of political and civil liberties, 
as well as the realisation of the Croatian people’s right to elect, in free elec-
tions, the representatives and government system of its choice. 
The aim of the fierce KPJ campaign was to disable the most dangerous 
opponent among Croats by equating Maček’s views with the Ustashas’, and 
to replace the HSS with the newly formed HRSS. The HRSS was a party 
lacking organisation and membership, and its Executive Committee, under 
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the old party name, was implementing the KPJ political programme among 
the Croatian peasantry. As a kind of Communist section for peasants, whose 
activities depended on the work of its immediate leadership and local 
Communist organisations, it was to serve the KPJ in reaching the peasants 
and dispersing their fears of Communism. The HRSS was mostly used in the 
NF pre-election campaigns. When the KPJ established itself in power, the 
HRSS started to die out quickly and disappeared from the political scene. 
Having totally taken over the government system, the KPJ achieved full NF 
precedence for the elections for the Constituent Assembly of FNRJ and the 
Constituent Assembly of the NRH, and thus confirmed its absolute predom-
inance. The initiatives that were persistently being taken by some HSS lead-
ership members were cut through by the KPJ’s radicalised repressive policy 
in 1947, consisting of staged political processes. Most of the tried HSS lead-
ers were being convicted for their make-believe treason, co-operation with the 
enemy, associating with the imperialist forces, spying and terrorism. 
Maček’s ideas and followers became synonyms for treason and alliance with 
the Ustasha movement, which was the government’s instrument for prevent-
ing any HSS activities. When certain opposition activities could not be labelled 
as being Ustasha, they were just incriminated as Maček’s. Unlike the HSS, the 
Ustasha movement, which was active through Crusader groups, after its 
national, religious and racial bigotry, and the defeat in the war, adjusted its 
crucial political starting points to the new circumstances, and sought its 
new allies in the West. But the advantage the Communists had obtained was 
irretrievable. 
The revengeful conduct was the winner’s right and the big powers failed 
to react. The Communists found justification for their radicalism, which 
was sometimes at lower levels accompanied by Serb retribution, as revenge 
for the Ustasha radicalism. In the world divided by the cold war, Communist 
Yugoslavia, since 1948 disloyal to the world’s Communist movement, found 
itself at its borders, and the world’s major powers were trying to win or at 
least not to lose it. In such conditions, the opposition could not get real sup-
port, and the population, exhausted by the war and post-war violence and 
poverty, having lived to see the fall of the NDH and the end of the civil war, 
accepted the Communist government, which offered hope, especially to young 
people, of a better and more righteous life. Even the most dedicated followers 
of the HSS and the Crusader movement failed to offer a strong and long-last-
ing resistance. The Catholic Church, however, as a religious institution, which 
the KPJ could not subject to its direct control, , was seen by many as a possible 
centre of resistance  for all those who thought that  Communist Yugoslavia did 
not and would not satisfy the social and national aspirations of the Croatian 
people.
Translated by Ida Jurković
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Die Opposition in Kroatien 1945-1950
Zusammenfassung
Aufgrund von Archivquellen und Literatur stellt der vorliegende Beitrag 
die Lage in Kroatien nach Kriegsende und der Regierungsübernahme sei-
tens der Kommunistischen Partei Jugoslawiens (KPJ) von 1945 bis 1950 knapp 
dar. Hervorgehoben wird die Tätigkeit der Opposition, deren legale und ille-
gale Aktivitäten. Die Opposition wirkt nicht einheitlich.  Einheit beweisen ver-
schiedene Oppositionszweige nur im Widerstand gegen die kommunistische 
Diktatur, während die Vorgehensart und die endgültigen Ziele der verschiede-
nen Oppositionsbewegungen Unterschiede aufweisen. Sie befassten sich mit der 
Lage Kroatiens innerhalb Jugoslawien, der politischen Ordnung, dem Stand der 
Bürgerrechte und politischer Freiheiten. Wegen der vehementen Repression der 
Kommunistischen Partei und der allgegenwärtigen Angst, neben gleichzeitiger 
Siegeseuphorie und dem in einem Teil der Bevölkerung herrschenden Glauben, dass 
nach dem Krieg gerade die Kommunistische Partei im Stande sei, eine gerechtere 
Gesellschaft aufzubauen, vermochte keine andere Partei oder Bewegung sich erneut 
zu organisieren, ein ganzheitliches politisches Programm aufzubauen, geschweige 
denn systematisch und langfristig Einfluss auszuüben. 
Den Zeitraum von 1945-1950 kennzeichnete die KPJ, die ihre grenzenlo-
se und unangefochtene Herrschaft verwirklichte aufgrund der Wiedergründung 
Jugoslawiens, dem Anschluss an die antifaschistische Siegerkoalition und der 
Durchführung revolutionärer Maßnahmen, selbst wenn diese nur in formaler 
Hinsicht demokratisch waren.

